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HOW IS SEX HARASSMENT DISCRIMINATORY? 
Noa Ben-Asher* 
What is sexual harassment, and what is its actual harm?  Since the 1980s, these 
two questions have perplexed lawmakers, policymakers, feminists, and the public.1  
Today, with the rise of #MeToo, and with increased national attention to Title IX 
claims regarding sexual violence on college campuses, these questions are once 
again in the spotlight.  As some commentators have observed, in the last several 
years lawmakers and policymakers have been increasingly influenced by a feminist 
antisubordination approach to sexual harassment and assault.2  This growing 
influence is currently reflected in more strict standards of consent (“affirmative 
consent”) to sex, in higher procedural and substantive burdens on those accused of 
sexual harassment or assault, and in closer governmental monitoring of institutional 
settings, such as public universities. 
Feminist Judgments3 takes us to a key moment in the history of sexual 
harassment law.  In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,4 the Supreme Court recognized 
for the first time that both quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment 
violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5  It also held that to be actionable 
under Title VII, sexual advances must be (1) “unwelcome”6 and (2) “sufficiently 
severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create 
an abusive working environment.’”7  The latter part of the test (“sufficiently severe 
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887–91 (2016); Aya Gruber, Consent Confusion, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 415, 418–19 (2016); Janet 
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 3 FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
(Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2016) [hereinafter FEMINIST 
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 4 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 5 See id. at 65. 
 6 Id. at 68 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1985)). 
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“Unwelcome” conduct has typically been understood as one which an employee did not solicit or 
incite and which is regarded as undesirable or offensive.  See Kristen Konrad Tiscione, 
Commentary on Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 3, at 297, 
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or pervasive”) fits well into the liberal-feminist judicial attitudes in the 1970s and 
1980s that emphasized gender equality and the integration of women in the 
workplace.8  The problem with sexual harassment under this Ginsburgian liberal 
framework is that it impairs the equal participation of women in the workplace.  The 
first part of the Meritor test (unwelcomeness), however, has been subject to intense 
debates among feminists.  What does it mean for a sexual advance to be unwelcome?  
Is the test objective or subjective?  Does welcomeness have to be conveyed 
affirmatively?  Can passive silence indicate welcomeness?  Does provocative dress 
matter?  The answers to these questions often depend on the branch of feminist 
thought that appeals to you.  For instance, according to antisubordination feminism, 
the primary harm of sexual harassment is sexual subordination: men use sexuality 
as a primary means to subordinate women to male power.9  By contrast, for liberal 
feminism, the focus is not so much on sexual subordination as it is on unequal 
opportunity in the workplace.10  
Interestingly, the fascinating feminist rewriting of Meritor by Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig reflects the large-scale shift toward antisubordination feminism in 
sexual harassment law.  Most importantly, Onwuachi-Willig rejects Meritor’s 
unwelcomeness standard.  As Kristen Konrad Tiscione explains, the unwelcomeness 
test “distracts the decisionmaker from what should be the central inquiry: the 
behavior of the harasser and the effect of that behavior on both the workplace and 
the victim.”11  Namely, the problem with the unwelcomeness test is that due to power 
differentials between supervisor and subordinate, it is common for a subordinate to 
say “yes” if they wish to “be accepted, get promoted, or save [their] job.”12  
Onwuachi-Willig’s normative position is that Title VII is violated by acts that 
“unreasonably interfere with the complainant’s work performance, create a hostile 
or intimidating environment, and/or help to preserve patterns of sex segregation in 
employment.”13  If harassment enforces “the notion of the dominant and powerful 
man over the subordinate woman,” a hostile environment exists.14  In addition, the 
work environment ought to be evaluated from the perspective of a “reasonable 
 
298 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 903).  The Court also concluded that Vinson’s clothes and speech 
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 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 315. 
 14 Id. at 316. 
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victim in the complainant’s shoes,”15 and “dress is not relevant to the inquiry of 
welcomeness.”16  In contrast with the original Supreme Court decision, Onwuachi-
Willig also finds employers “strictly liable” for the actions of their employees 
because they are “best positioned to communicate to all employees how they must 
treat others in the workplace.”17  Under this strict liability standard, employers could 
be perfectly vigilant, yet be held liable for an employee’s sexual harassment of 
another by mere relationship of employment. 
In this feminist rewriting of Meritor, the legal investigation into sexual 
harassment in the workplace does not explicitly include an inquiry into what the 
complainant wanted or even communicated to the accused.  The question of 
unwelcomeness is left out.  What matters is how the accused behaved.  This feminist 
judgment, which echoes antisubordination feminism, has important overlaps with 
the current shifts toward greater regulation of sex on college campuses and 
“affirmative consent” standards.18  While it is beyond the scope of this Essay to 
assess whether the growing dominance of antisubordination feminism in this area of 
law is desirable, it will be interesting to see whether the influence of #MeToo will 
lead courts, lawmakers, and employers, toward the more plaintiff-friendly standards 
suggested by Onwuachi-Willig.
 
 15 Id. at 315. 
 16 Id. at 321. 
 17 Id. at 320. 
 18 See Gruber, supra note 2, at 429–40; Halley, supra note 2. 
